It has been more than 25 years since the European Union (EU) established its policy initiative towards the Mediterranean region, the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the ‘Barcelona Process’. The policy framework was reconsidered and reframed within the context of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) that was launched in 2004. The review of the ENP in 2015 brought yet a further change to the cooperation framework and proposed ways to build more effective partnerships in the Neighbourhood, attaching greater emphasis on stability (in security and economic terms); more differentiation in relations with neighbouring countries (i.e. doing more with ‘partners’); and greater emphasis on shared interests.
Arguably, the new focus was a response to the uncertainty, both over the EU’s own role and effectiveness as a ‘normative actor’ and in the region which found itself in turmoil following the Arab uprisings. This short commentary aims to discuss the policy initiative with regards to Turkey-EU relations and the approach of the parties towards the region given that the region is the common neighbourhood for both and an area of common interest. Do we observe convergence or divergence in the orientations and policies of Turkey and the EU vis-à-vis their neighbourhood? There is no direct or easy answer to this question.
The Barcelona process intended to create dialogue, cooperation, and an area of peace, security, and prosperity in the Mediterranean region, constituting a ‘ring of friends’ around the EU. EU’s approach had an inherent emphasis on the normative dimension, prioritizing good governance, democracy, rule of law, and human rights. The normative approach would form the basis for the overall aim of achieving security and stability in the EU’s immediate neighbourhood.
The initiative was established at a time when the EU was going through a process of accelerated deepening and widening and enjoyed a transformative role given the transition from communism to liberalism in the Central and Eastern European countries. The success in the enlargement process encouraged the EU to launch the European Neighbourhood Policy in 2004 and embed the EMP into the ENP. The ENP assumed a similar approach to the accession process less the membership. The policy approach was renewed in 2015 following the Arab uprisings and most recently in February 2021, 25 years after the Barcelona Declaration, aiming for “sustainable long-term socio-economic recovery and job creation in the Southern Neighbourhood” given perhaps the difficulties that are further exacerbated by the global pandemic.
Turkey and the EU have not always been on the same page regarding the Mediterranean. Turkey was indifferent towards the EMP when it was first launched in 1995 primarily because Turkey was perceived as a peripheral, neighbouring country to the European Union. Turkey was interested in benefiting from the development funds provided through the EMP, however, the Greek veto and the EU conditions attached prevented extension of such benefits to Turkey.
A common point of interest was to improve relations with the countries of the region. Turkey pursued a process of transformation aligning its domestic and foreign policy approach with the EU, especially after it received the status of a candidate state at the EU Helsinki summit in 1999. Indeed, one of Turkey’s aims was to start and further the negotiations for membership in the early 2000s. The 2000s are largely seen as a period of convergence between the EU and Turkey due to the Europeanization of Turkey’s foreign policy and/or its neighbourhood policy, partly in line with the requirement of good neighbourly relations. This change can also be associated with Turkey’s intention to diversify its foreign and economic partners to further Turkey’s national foreign and security interests, primarily in the Eastern Mediterranean region.
But the interests of Turkey and the EU began to diverge significantly in the late 2000s, due partly to differences on the Cyprus issue and mixed signals from the EU concerning Turkey’s status of membership. The 2007 French initiative on the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) was perceived by Turkish officials as an alternative to Turkey’s full EU membership, adding to discussions on the idea of a ‘privileged partnership’ with Turkey.
From the late 2000s onward, Turkey has become more involved in the political and security dimensions in the broader Mediterranean region using soft power instruments resembling the EU approach. However, the changing international political and security environment in the Mediterranean region with the Arab uprisings and Turkey’s deteriorating relations with Israel and Egypt have created more and more problems with some of the EU member states and the EU. Indeed, this was related to the very different security perceptions Turkey and the EU had vis-à-vis the Mediterranean region and the changing alliance structures that have brought Turkey to an adversarial position with some EU member states, primarily Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration.
Although Turkey and the EU cooperated on certain issues, most remarkably on migration in the context of the Turkey-EU Refugee Deal, to address the problems stemming from and exacerbated by the Syrian case, their relationship is marred with challenges that surround, but are not necessarily limited to, the Turkish-Greek problems. Turkish-Greek relations have entered into a more conflictual phase due to the stand-off on the eastern Mediterranean energy and sovereignty-related problems and the new phase of the Cyprus negotiations. The EU and some of the EU member states, most notably France, have extended unwarranted support to and declared solidarity with the Greek and Greek Cypriot positions on the negotiations for settlement and the new initiatives taken by the Turkish side on the opening of Varosha.
The world, and indeed the Mediterranean region, are going through a far different international context than when the Barcelona process was initiated in 1995 or the ENP was launched in 2004. It may well be put forward that the EU’s intent to transform the Mediterranean region through a normative, liberal peace approach has failed. Indeed, the financial and political shortcomings of the EU approach are more visible than ever. Besides, the EU approach shifted towards a pragmatic approach that prioritizes security over the promotion of values in an international context where realpolitik prevails. The EU approach is largely focused on finding quick solutions to problems of migration and terrorism whereas Turkey’s focus centres around its rivalry with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration which has broadened to include the issues of energy and above all sovereignty in the eastern Mediterranean region. Turkish officials perceive the EU as a biased actor, increasingly presenting Turkey as an adversary, a competitor, and a state to be excluded from the regional developments.
EU member states’ individual policy choices in the Mediterranean region indicate a stronger approach emphasizing national interests and an exclusionary adversarial approach, especially with respect to Turkey. At best, Turkey is seen as a buffer zone, a peripheral state with which there is a need to cooperate on a case-by-case approach to deal with immediate security problems.
The recent unfortunate statements by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Austrian Chancellor Stefan Kurz are indicative of this increasingly dominant approach in the EU. Indeed, despite its renewed agenda that was communicated in February 2021, the EU approach towards the Mediterranean region will fall short of expectations in the face of new global problems that are likely to exacerbate the already existing problems and conflictual relations in the region and the immediate concerns of the European Union.
* An earlier version of this article appeared on the Near East Bulletin (No. 01/2021).
