The subsequent statements by ExxonMobil in early April and ENI and Total in early May to put their programmes on hold following the slump in the demand and drop in the prices of oil due to the pandemic and the Saudi-Russian rift seem to have altered the momentum in the struggle for power in the Eastern Mediterranean (East Med). Will this lead to a major change in the fortunes of the East Med gas? Will the changes drive the parties towards overcoming their differences? For this there needs to be a strong will towards concrete negotiations on the Cyprus issue.
Rather than being a catalyst for a solution to the Cyprus issue, the energy resources around the island have turned out to be a game-changer in a negative sense intensifying the struggle for power and increasing tension among the actors across the East Med. This was in congruence with the international dynamics: in the 2010s, states increasingly considered political and strategic stakes much higher and economic nationalism became the driving policy approach. The Arab uprisings exacerbated the tendency towards fragmentation and polarization leading to recurrent bilateral/multilateral crisis in the region. These included the bilateral crisis between Turkey-Israel and Turkey-Egypt as well as the competitive approach of the states of wider region towards the conflicts in Syria and in Libya.
Greece and the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ (RoC, controlled de facto by the Greek Cypriots) built upon Turkey’s deteriorating relations and perceived ‘loneliness’ in the region to enhance their relations. Here, one may say that the RoC was internationalizing the Cyprus issue to pressurize Turkey by means of energy. In December 2010 RoC reached an agreement with Israel on the delimitation of its exclusive economic zone following the Mavi Marmara flotilla crisis and subsequently started the drilling process in 2011 despite Turkish objections. This started of a process that expanded respectively in 2013 and 2014 with exploration licenses granted to international oil companies and the signing of trilateral memorandums of understanding between Greece-Cyprus-Israel and Greece-Cyprus-Egypt. The Greek Cypriot exploration attempts were further enhanced through licencing of drilling rights to international oil companies such as ENI, Total, ExxonMobil and Qatar Petroleum in April 2017. The next steps intended to deepen the connection among the countries involved, aiming to move from partnerships of convenience towards more established alliances on issues beyond the East Med gas including the development of relations ‘on all fronts’ with Saudi Arabia among others.
Turkey’s interpretation of the Greek and Greek Cypriot policy approaches as attempts to corner Turkey and render her a passive actor in the region led Turkey to redefine her engagement with the East Med. An important turning point regarding Turkey’s approach on the hydrocarbons was to send, in April 2017, the Barbaros seismic vessel to areas with overlapping claims. Turkey gave a stronger signal that it would follow a more assertive approach and implement preventive measures countering such acts that might endanger rights of Turkey and those of Turkish Cypriots entitled to equal rights and co-ownership of the resources on and offshore the island. This was followed with the intervention of Turkish navy vessels of the drilling activities of ENI, within areas of overlapping claims in February 2018. An important aspect of this process was the diplomatic efforts that were pursued with the ENI and Foreign Ministry officials in Italy, also involving Turkish Cypriot officials. The start of the drilling process in May 2019 in disputed areas was perhaps the most assertive policy choice from Ankara. The move to sign a memorandum with Libya, in November 2019, on the delimitation of the maritime jurisdiction areas between the two states further tilted the balance in the East Med rivalry. Seeing Turkey as the problematic actor here however, as the Greek and Greek Cypriot political elites often do, would be misleading.
The failure of the Cyprus negotiations in Crans-Montana which brought the process on the brink of a settlement was, for the Turkish Cypriots, the result of unwavering Greek Cypriot approach on power sharing and political equality. The outright rejection by the Greek Cypriot political leaders of the Turkish Cypriot proposal in July 2019 to establish a joint committee to address tensions on the subject of hydrocarbons was yet another stride that strengthened the Turkish Cypriot belief that the Greek Cypriot side was not willing to accept the equal rights of the Turkish Cypriots.
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, its economic ramifications, and the subsequent uncertainty in the demand for energy presents various puzzles for border disputes and the exploration of the gas fields in the Eastern Mediterranean. A prolonged global economic crisis and lower levels of demand for energy resources may put the future market possibilities of the East Med gas and the future of East Med pipeline in jeopardy. However, if one considers the East Med from a geostrategic perspective, it is unreasonable to expect a total loss of interest on the part of the major powers towards the region, despite the high unit cost of gas. In this context, the economic links and networks Ankara has developed in the region, despite political obstacles, offer several opportunities and alternative, more feasible scenarios including the possibility of a pipeline between Turkey and Israel which the two sides have not ruled out.
A major breakthrough in the short-term regarding Cyprus and the wider energy plans is unlikely however given the short-termism and the political timeline that awaits the island in terms of the forthcoming October 2020 presidential elections in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and the parliamentary elections in the Republic of Cyprus in 2021. The outcome of the two however may help in bringing up a new dialogue.
* An earlier version of this article appeared on the Near East Bulletin (No.01/2020).
