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The Turkish Parliamentary Elite and the EU: Mapping Attitudes towards the European Union

Sait Akşit, Özgehan Şenyuva and Işık Gürleyen

This study aims to map out the opinions and attitudes of the Turkish parliamentary elite regarding Turkey's membership of the European Union in general and the future of Europe in particular. The parliamentary elite group consists of political party representatives present in the current Turkish Grand National Assembly. The study uses the findings of the Turkish Elite Survey 2009 conducted by the Center for European Studies, Middle East Technical University. The article argues that while Turkish parliamentarians support Turkey's entry into the EU, particularly on security grounds, there are significant signs of lack of trust in EU institutions.

Keywords: European Union; Turkey–EU Relations; Elite Survey; Political Elite; Enlargement; Integration

Turkey's longstanding relationship with the EU gained momentum following the December 1999 European Union (EU) Helsinki Summit decision to grant Turkey the status of a candidate state. In the aftermath of this summit, the political reforms required to meet the membership conditions of the EU topped the agenda of Turkish politics. Turkey initiated a series of constitutional and legal amendments with the aim of fulfilling the requirements of membership. The political reform process took on a new phase with the start of the negotiations on 3 October 2005 and is still continuing even though its pace has slowed down. This foreign policy priority of Turkey, first and foremost, involves the parliamentary elite—the members of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi—TBMM)—who play a significant role as the legislative power in the EU-related reform process.

In spite of the fact that European integration is often described as an elite-driven process, the elite dimension is strikingly under-researched; in particular, there is a lack of systematic data on parliamentary elites. The few political elite studies on

Turkey–EU relations have mostly been based on individual open-ended interviews, or have primarily concentrated on party positions towards the EU with an inherent assumption that Turkish members of parliament (MPs) in actual fact assume positions identical to their parties (see, for instance, Avcı 2006; Gürleyen 2008; Öniş 2009). There is a shortage of studies that take the individual MPs as the main unit of analysis. An important exception that provides an overview with replicable and structured data is the pioneering study by McLaren and Müftüler-Baç (2003) which analysed the perceptions on EU membership of Turkish MPs in 2002. With the 2002 elections, a new parliamentary elite has emerged (Sayarı & Hasanov 2008), but a systematic study on the perceptions of this new elite has not been carried out. Hence, this study aims to fill the gap in the Turkey–EU literature on the approaches of the parliamentary elite towards the EU.

This article provides a systematic descriptive analysis of the results of the *Turkish Elite Survey 2009*¹ by focusing on the attitudes of the Turkish parliamentary elites regarding Turkey's membership of the European Union in general and the future of Europe in particular. Since the data are retrieved from one wave of interviews, this study will remain mainly an exploration rather than a far-reaching analysis. The parliamentary elite were interviewed in order to address the following questions: What are the main characteristics of the attitudes of the Turkish political elite towards the issue of EU membership? How do the Turkish political elite perceive the future of Europe (mainly in terms of further integration and EU competences on key issues)?

The article starts with a brief theoretical background, examining the discussion of the role of elites in the foreign policy formation process in general. This section in particular addresses the political elite as a major driving force for European integration and stresses the role of the political elite in Turkey's ongoing negotiations for EU membership. The literature review is followed by a description of the survey sample and methodology. The following two sections of the article provide the data analysis: the first part focuses on the general attitudes of MPs towards the EU and Turkey's membership, while the second focuses on their views on the future of the EU.

The Political Elite and Turkey's EU membership

The role of elites in the foreign-policy-making process has long been debated in international relations (IR) literature. On the one hand, traditional IR scholars question the consideration of elites as a unit of analysis, except for the state elite; others, following the liberal approach, focus more on elite attitudes. The motivations of elites have been explored by putting forward either utilitarian concerns, which signify cost–benefit calculations of material interests such as economic and security interests, or ideational sources such as identity, universal norms and values (Holsti 2004; Goldstein & Keohane 1999).

European integration literature focuses essentially on elites, particularly on political elites, and this focus stems from the fact that the process has been driven by European elites, be they political, bureaucratic or societal (Haller 2008, p. 3; Bellamy & Warleigh

2001, p. 9). In this context, scholars have analysed the motivations, discourses and stances of elites in member states and/or candidate countries.

The attitudes of Turkish MPs towards Turkish membership of the EU are quite significant, particularly in the pre-accession phase. As a negotiating country, Turkey is obliged to undertake a large set of legal, technical and administrative changes. Despite the large scale of reforms already undertaken, the government needs to initiate another battery of legislative changes and obtain the approval of the TBMM to open further chapters or provisionally close the ongoing ones. The need for further reforms and legislative changes makes the Turkish parliament one of the most important actors in the membership process.

The importance of the elite as a major actor in Turkey–EU relations is firmly recognised in the literature. The reason for such a focus may be the fact that, since its inception in 1959, Turkey’s membership process on both the EU and Turkish sides has been solely led by the political elite in a manner very detached from other segments of society. Nonetheless, the Turkey–EU literature is strikingly different from other case studies of European integration in terms of the lack of empirical-analytical analyses. While political elites are widely studied empirically in the broader European integration literature, it is a rather new tendency to analyse empirically the motivations/positions of Turkish elites in initiating the process. Since the 1990s, empirical analysis of the attitudes of elites in Turkey has been gradually growing.

The research on the Turkish elite shares similarities with the broader literature regarding the lack of attention paid to certain groups; for instance, the economic elite is a powerful but frequently neglected elite group in the European integration literature and also in the analyses of Turkey–EU relations.² In general, the support of economic elites is taken for granted because the EU provides ample opportunities for the business sector. While the cultural elite are rather neglected in the broader context, with the exception of the media elite, they are particularly overlooked in the literature on Turkey.³ Methodologically, it is a major weakness that a comparative perspective—comparing elites in different countries—is rarely employed in the analyses.⁴ Furthermore, the relationships between different elite groups, on the one hand, and between elites and non-elites, on the other, have not received sufficient attention from scholars.⁵ Above all, the fact that there are very few empirical analyses on the Turkish political elite is a remarkable weakness of the literature. As mentioned above, the study by McLaren and Müftüler-Baç (2003) is an exception in this regard. Since the latter, the only example until the present is the survey of the opposition Republican People’s Party (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi—CHP) deputies in 2005 (Gülmez 2008).

This study aims to contribute to the empirical work on the Turkish political elite with data obtained from interviews. Utilitarian and ideational sources of Turkish elite perceptions on Turkey–EU relations and the EU are identified using a structured questionnaire. It is hoped that outcomes of this study will also facilitate comparisons with the results of other surveys on the positions and attitudes of the parliamentary elite in Turkey and other European states.

Sample and Methodology

The findings of this study are based on the Turkish Elite Survey 2009⁶ conducted in cooperation with the IntUne project⁷ in order to create systematic and comparative data. The respondents consisted of political party representatives present in the current TBMM (formed after the 2007 elections). As part of the survey, 62 MPs—out of a total of 550 MPs in the TBMM—were interviewed in the period of June–December 2009. The interviews were conducted face to face, with a structured questionnaire based on close-ended questions. Each interview took on average 40 minutes. All analyses included in this article are given in valid percentages, calculated as a proportion of total valid answers, excluding ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Refusal’.

The sample of the 62 interviewed Turkish MPs was selected through quota sampling according to the methodology set by the IntUne project. The number of MPs from different parties reflected the distribution of seats among the parties in the assembly: 39 of our respondents were Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi—AKP) representatives, ten CHP, eight National Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi—MHP), four Democratic Left Party (Demokratik Sol Parti—DSP) and one Democratic Society Party (Demokratik Toplum Partisi—DTP). In the sample, the DSP was over-represented, as it had only eight seats in the TBMM at the time our survey was conducted. On the other hand, the DTP was under-represented, as its representation in the assembly amounted to 20 seats. We were able to interview only one DTP representative, due mainly to inability to contact members of that party, their refusal to be interviewed, or the judicial process that the party was going through: the DTP, which represents Kurdish voters, was banned by the Constitutional Court on 11 December 2009 and two of its MPs were expelled from parliament, subsequent to which the remaining party members established the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi—BDP).

Our sample took into account the gender balance in parliament (12.9 per cent of our respondents were female while the female representation in parliament was 8.85 per cent) and was representative in terms of age (the average age of the MPs in the TBMM was 54.3 and in our sample 53.2). The discussion below refers to the political elite in general, as the parliamentarians interviewed include 16 former ministers, former or present standing committee chairs/deputy chairs or chairs of international parliamentary groups. Twelve of this group of frontbenchers were AKP members, two MHP, one CHP and one DSP. Their average age was 56.75. In addition, 18 of the MPs we interviewed were deputy chairs or parliamentary assembly members. Thirteen of these MPs were AKP members, three CHP and two MHP. The average age of these respondents was 50.11. Given the small size of the sample, the deviations do not present problems with regard to representation. Thus, we did not weight the results.

Having the frontbencher MPs included in our sample resulted in a particular picture in terms of the basic characteristics of the respondents, particularly with regard to their level of education. Of the MPs in the TBMM 94.5 per cent held a university degree (Sayarı & Hasanov 2008, p. 354), yet the level of education of the MPs in our

sample was higher than the average: 37 per cent of the respondents had a PhD degree, and 32 per cent had a master's degree. These figures indicate that the frontbench MPs are selected from among the better educated, who tend to be specialised and more experienced compared with other MPs.

General Attitudes and Ideas About the EU and Turkey's Membership

A major portion of the Turkish Elite Survey 2009 focused on opinions on the EU and Turkey's membership. The respondents were asked a large set of questions regarding the EU, its institutions, Turkish membership and policy-making. The results presented in this article focus on the three dimensions of Europeanness: the *emotive dimension*, level of attachment to country and Europe; the *cognitive-evaluative dimension*, the EU's structure and functioning and the progress and nature of Turkey's negotiations; and the *projective dimension*, the future of the EU and the role of Turkey in the future.⁸ The main aim of this set of questions was to gain insights on the thoughts and motivations of the individuals responsible for making necessary legislative reforms and changes during accession negotiation as well as communicating these to the general public.

One of the important findings of the survey was the unified support for Turkey's membership of the EU among the MPs. When asked if Turkey's membership in the EU would be 'a good thing' or a 'bad thing', an overwhelming majority of the MPs (98.4 per cent) stated that it would be a 'good thing' while only one respondent believed it would be 'neither a good nor a bad thing'. When asked to evaluate if 'Turkey would benefit from membership', again a similar majority (96.8 per cent) indicated that Turkey would benefit from eventual membership, while only 3.2 per cent believed Turkey would not benefit. These two indicators show us that among the MPs there is a high level of support on the issue of Turkey's membership of the EU, regardless of individual differences. This also points to a broad consensus among the MPs from the governing and the opposition parties.

When asked how they perceived the EU, a large majority of MPs responded that they have a 'positive' image of the EU: 9.8 per cent have a 'strongly positive' image and 68.9 per cent have a 'somewhat positive' image. Only 11.5 per cent of the MPs interviewed have a 'somewhat negative' image of the EU and 9.8 per cent have neither a positive nor a negative image.

Despite the clear support for Turkey's membership of the EU and the rather positive image of the EU, our survey revealed certain problematic issues among the attitudes of the MPs. One of the important dimensions is the issue of trust/distrust in EU institutions, which signifies both utilitarian and ideational sources of elite attitudes. The positive approach of Turkish MPs does not translate into a feeling of trust in European institutions (Table 1). This attitude towards European institutions is somewhat negative when compared with EU member states considered by the IntUne project. On a 0–10 scale, 10 being the highest level of trust, the trust in the European Commission of the Turkish MPs interviewed is 5.04 against an average of 5.90 in South European member states (SEU4) (Italy: 5.5; Portugal: 5.9; Greece: 6.0; Spain: 6.2) and

Table 1 Level of Trust in EU Institutions (0–10 scale)

	<i>N</i>	Mean	Standard deviation
The European Commission	62	5.04	1.86
The European Parliament	62	4.33	1.71
The European Union Council	62	4.82	1.54

Source: Turkish Elite Survey 2009.

5.6 for the EU17⁹; with regard to trust in the European Parliament (EP) it is 4.33 points compared with 6.4 in the SEU4 and 6.1 in the EU17; and as far as trust in the European Union Council is concerned it is 4.82 points against 6.0 in the SEU4 and 5.8 in the EU17 (See Conti, Cotta & de Almeida 2010, p. 128).

Previous studies argue that it is plausible that institutions, their functioning and individuals' evaluation of their performance shape the development of identifications and level of support (Brewer, Hermann & Risse 2004). The negative attitude of our respondents towards the EP was not surprising given the critical approach of the EP towards Turkey. Various EP reports have widely criticised Turkey on the issues of democracy and human rights; what is more, some of the issues brought forward by the EP are perceived in Turkey as attempts to create new conditions on the route to membership, leading to widespread suspicion of EU institutions among Turkish parliamentarians.

This low level of trust in EU institutions has potential importance in our analysis, for the pace and success of the ongoing negotiations. If the parliamentary elite harbour certain question marks about the nature of EU institutions' decisions, it may prove highly problematic for the European Commission to make reform demands in the accession process. This low level of trust may also stem from the constant mixed signals from the EU regarding Turkey's membership, and from the increasing debate on 'privileged partnership'.

The other issue that appeared along with the low level of trust was the widespread belief that Turkey's interests are not being taken into account by the decision-makers within the EU. The majority of Turkish parliamentarians (strongly agree: 22.6 per cent; agree somewhat: 62.9) felt that those who make decisions at the EU level did not take Turkey's interests into account. Only 14.5 per cent of the respondents disagreed with such a statement. This is contradictory to the overall supportive stance of elites towards Turkey's EU membership.

Our survey also revealed that among the MPs there is a strong feeling of 'being ignored' in their relations with decision-makers within the EU. When presented with the statement, 'Decision makers in the EU do not take into account what people like me think,' 70 per cent of the respondents agreed (strongly agree + agree somewhat). While this perceived feeling of exclusion seems to be a cross-party issue, it appears to be stronger among the MPs from the opposition parties. Ninety per cent of the MPs interviewed from the main opposition party, CHP, agreed with the statement, while the agreement rate fell to 56 per cent among the MPs from the governing party.

In addition to the questions on the EU and its institutions, we also included a battery of questions on the issues of identity and belonging. A longstanding assumption in the research on European support accepts that elites tend to be more European than the masses (Hooghe 2003). When asked how they would define themselves primarily, Turkish MPs overwhelmingly identified themselves with nationality (Figure 1). While 35.5 per cent identified themselves as Turkish only, 55 per cent of the respondents indicated that they see themselves primarily as Turkish and then as European. While only 6.5 per cent of the interviewed MPs identified themselves primarily as European and later Turkish, none of the respondents declared 'European only' as their main personal identification.

The self-definition of the respondents was also confirmed by their degree of identification with Turkey as well as the EU. The respondents predominantly identified themselves with nationality, and the low level of attachment to the EU became more apparent with the answers to these questions. Of the Turkish parliamentarians 98.4 per cent stated that they feel attached to Turkey, in comparison with 57.6 per cent who feel attached to the EU. While there is only one MP who feels 'not very attached' to Turkey, almost 40 per cent of the respondents do not feel attached to the EU. Five per cent of the participating MPs refused to answer a question on attachment to the EU.

As our analysis reveals, Turkish MPs have a low level of attachment to the EU, corresponding to a low level of trust in EU institutions. This result is consistent with Roux and Verzichelli's assumption that 'a very high degree of identification with the




Figure 1 Self-Definition of Identity. *Source:* Turkish Elite Survey 2009.

supranational polity should correspond to a high degree of trust in EU institutions' (Roux & Verzichelli 2010, p. 14).

A striking outcome of our analysis was the threat perception among Turkish parliamentarians. A general assumption is that threat is a relevant factor for collective identity building, and Lauren McLaren (2006) argues that a perceived cultural threat results in decrease in support for further European integration. Other studies (Carey 2002) have shown that this is particularly true for public opinion. Our respondents do not perceive the EU as a danger to the cultural integrity of Turkey: 97 per cent disagree (disagree somewhat + strongly disagree) with the idea that the EU poses a threat, whereas only three per cent agree somewhat. This outcome indicates that the reasons for the low level of trust in the EU institutions and low level of attachment to the EU should be sought elsewhere than in a perceived threat to cultural integrity.

All the general perceptions regarding the institutions and policies of the EU are intimately linked with the level of knowledge of the respondents. The survey also included a self-assessment question on one's level of knowledge of the EU, its institutions and its policies. On a 0–10 scale, with 10 representing the highest level of knowledge, the mean score of the MPs' responses was rather high: 6.9, with a standard deviation of 1.67.

Turkish Parliamentarians and the Future of EU–Turkey Relations

Each enlargement round of the EU has brought about changes within the EU in terms of redefining political dynamics, institutional structure and policy priorities. Considering the size and potential weight of Turkey, its own characteristics and priorities will be of utmost importance for the EU in the event of membership, especially given the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty.¹⁰ According to article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, the standard system of voting in the Council of Ministers will be 'Qualified majority voting' (QMV), based on the principle of double majority. This indicates that any decision will need the support of 55 per cent of the member states (currently 15 out of 27 EU countries), representing a minimum of 65 per cent of the EU's population. This point is important given the population of Turkey, which is more than 70 million as of 2011. The same article in Lisbon Treaty also increased the number of policy areas where co-decision procedure will be applied, increasing the weight of the EP, where Turkey will also have a sizeable number of members owing to its population. However, while there is a multiplicity of surveys dealing with this question at the public level, the perceptions of the elite on the future of the EU are often neglected. We believe that the policy priorities of Turkey's leading elite, as well as their opinions on the structure, policies and characteristics of the EU, deserve special attention for the future dynamics of the EU. As such, Turkey's eventual membership in relation to the future of the EU was an important part of our survey, within which a detailed series of questions aimed to elicit the preferences and policy choices of Turkish parliamentarians.

One of the important findings of the survey concerned the Turkish parliamentarians' strong support for further European unification. When asked if the level of integration has gone too far or should be further strengthened, on a 0–10 scale with 0 representing

'Unification has gone too far' and 10 representing 'Unification should be strengthened', the mean score of the responses came out as 7.05 with a standard deviation of 2.5. This support for further unification was also reflected in opinions on the institutions and policies of the EU: 93.4 per cent of the MPs agreed that the EU needs a common constitution and 77 per cent of them were in favour of having a president of the EU. Turkish parliamentarians also tended to support the European Commission becoming the true government of the EU: 64.5 per cent of the MPs agreed (strongly agree + agree somewhat) with the statement on the European Commission, while 30 per cent of the respondents disagreed (disagree strongly + disagree somewhat).

In line with utilitarian perspectives of integration, we asked questions relating to the perceived material benefits of membership. The 'main purpose of the EU' emerged as a polarising issue among the Turkish MPs. When they were asked whether the main purpose of the EU should be to make the European economy *more competitive* or to provide better *social security* for citizens, their responses were evenly distributed. The percentage of the MPs arguing for a more competitive EU (42.9 per cent) was slightly higher than the percentage of the MPs supporting the idea of a social Europe (35.7 per cent). Although it was not spelled out as an option, 21.4 per cent of the respondents chose both.

Turkish MPs were generally more enthusiastic about the notion of security—compared with other dimensions of integration—as a defining feature of the European integration process. On the question of a European army, they were supportive: 75.8 per cent of the MPs expressed that they would like to see both a national and a European army, while 16.1 per cent stated that they supported the existence of a national army only. Those who said that there should only be a European army and no national armies were only 6.5 per cent of the respondents. The notion of European integration also received support on the issue of European security. When asked which authority should be responsible for providing European security, 51.6 per cent named the EU, compared with 22.6 per cent who named the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO).

However, Turkish parliamentarians tended to be less enthusiastic about the delegation of authority when it comes to security policy. Only 27.4 per cent of the MPs stated that decisions regarding security policy should be taken at the EU level when Turkey becomes a member. On the other hand, almost half of the respondents (48.5 per cent) stated a preference for keeping security-policy-making at the national level. The ratio of MPs who think that there should be close cooperation, and that security policy should be made at both national and EU levels, was only 21 per cent. This indicates that, despite strongly supporting a European security policy and favouring the establishment of a European army that would coexist with the national army, Turkish parliamentarians are very reluctant to delegate policy-making on security issues. These results are also supported by Turkish resistance to the establishment of a full-fledged relationship between the EU and NATO. Turkey's elite would like to see more joint initiatives, but is not willing to support any integration process that would exclude Turkey from decision-making.¹¹

The parliamentary elites were more likely to delegate authority on issues they consider 'soft', such as environment and energy policies. While 42 per cent of the

respondents thought that energy policy should be handled at the EU level when Turkey becomes a member, 16.1 per cent believed energy policy should be dealt with at both the national and the EU levels. The preference for EU policy-making was even clearer on environmental policy: 60 per cent of the MPs believed the EU should be in charge, and 11.3 per cent argued that authority should be assigned to both national and EU levels.

Where Do We Go from Here?

The descriptive analyses presented above point to certain conclusions and potential hypotheses for future research. To begin with, the support for the EU among Turkish parliamentarians from both the government and the opposition is strong. Similarly, the EU has a rather positive image in the eyes of the MPs, and they believe that Turkey would benefit from being an EU member.

In contrast to the strong support for membership, the MPs appear to have a low level of trust in the EU and its institutions. The European Commission enjoys the highest level of trust, whereas the EP is the least-trusted institution. The low level of trust may prove to have serious repercussions in the formulation of necessary legislation during the accession negotiations; without the necessary credibility, the EU institutions are very likely to face serious opposition on certain issues. One potential explanation for the low level of trust was reflected in the widespread agreement among the MPs that Turkey's interests were being ignored by European decision-makers. This belief suggests that in their dealings with the EU Turkish parliamentarians have a mindset of a win–lose situation. Such a widespread low level of trust among the political elite is an important issue that deserves further investigation and analysis.

Our survey, moreover, demonstrated that among Turkish parliamentarians national identity and attachment to nationality are very strong and European identity and European attachment are much weaker. This may prove to be an important factor in further analysis of motivations and determinants of policy actions in the course of Turkey–EU relations. In spite of the strong national identity and attachment, members of the Turkish parliament do not perceive the EU and Turkey's membership as a potential threat to Turkish cultural integrity.

Security matters appeared to be a policy area on which it may prove easier for the Turkish and European sides to cooperate. Taking into consideration the enthusiasm of Turkish parliamentarians for further European unification, and especially the formation of a European security structure as well as a European army, one may argue that successful security cooperation may have a spillover effect on other dimensions of Turkey–EU relations.

When considered with reference to the three dimensions of Europeanness, it seems that, while on the *projective dimension* there is strong enthusiasm for future integration, there are variations in the *emotive dimension*, with low levels of attachment to Europe, and a low level of identification and low scores on the *cognitive-evaluative dimension*, particularly on the issue of trust.

Finally, five issues stand out as areas that may deserve further research and analysis. The first possible research area is the changes over time in the opinions and attitudes of Turkish parliamentarians on the European issues, and how they have been affected by different actors and dynamics involved in the accession process. A second area is the relationship between individual MPs and party structure/hierarchy. By outlining the interaction between the party leadership and individual MPs, and focusing on the inner party mechanisms, one could find out how many of the individual MPs' attitudes are reflected in their actions. Another area of investigation is the convergence and divergence between elite and public opinion. A fourth area is the detailed analysis of the attitudes towards EU issues of various Turkish elites—political, economic and social. Important issues, such as whether there is consensus or divergence among different elites, and the causes of and motivations for any divergence should be analysed. A final potential research area is applying the theoretical dimension of elite opinions and attitudes to elite research in Turkey.

Turkish parliamentarians certainly take into account cost–benefit considerations besides evaluating Turkey's accession process as one that strengthens democratic norms and values as well as freedoms and liberties in Turkey. This duality deserves further attention and may also be approached with an analysis of diffuse versus specific support.¹²

Notes

- [1] The research was funded by a grant from the project on Strengthening and Integrating Academic Networks (SInAN) financed by the Central Finance and Contracts Unit of the Republic of Turkey under the 'Promotion of Civil Society Dialogue between the EU and Turkey: Universities Grant Scheme' (TR0604.01-03/092).
- [2] Two early examples of empirical analyses regarding economic elites are Keyman (2001) and Öniş and Türem (2001).
- [3] An important exception is the article by McLaren (2000).
- [4] Among the few exceptions are Öniş (2004), Lundgren (2006), Verney (2007) and Gürleyen and Tamvaki (2008).
- [5] See Gürleyen's (2008) comparison of 12 Turkish actors with respect to their attitudes towards European integration and EU's political conditionality.
- [6] The survey was constructed to cover different elite groups. For more information on the Turkish Elite Survey see Akşit, Şenyuva and Üstün (2009).
- [7] The IntUne project (Integrated and United? A Quest for Citizenship in an Ever Closer Europe) financed by the Sixth Framework Programme of the EU, Priority 7, Citizens and Governance in a Knowledge Based Society (CIT3-CT-2005-513421) was conducted in 19 countries including Turkey. For some of the first results of the IntUne project see the special issue of *South European Society and Politics* on 'European Citizenship in the Eyes of National Elites: A South European View', vol. 15, no. 1, 2010.
- [8] The three dimensions of Europeanness are taken from IntUne.
- [9] EU17 refers to EU member states where the IntUne survey was conducted, namely, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Spain, United Kingdom, and Bulgaria.

- [10] See the Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2007/C 306/01. Official Journal of the European Union, C 306, v 50, 17 December 2007.
- [11] For a detailed analysis of Turkish security culture and Turkey–EU relations on security matters from a historical perspective, see Üstün (2010).
- [12] For a detailed analysis of diffuse versus specific support, see Şenyuva (2008).

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