Limited statehood and the politics of security governance in the TRNC

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Abstract: This chapter evaluates the constitution of security orders in areas of limited statehood (ALS) through a study of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). It shows that the relationship between limited statehood and the specific security order is mediated by the nature of the security actors possessing power and capable of creating security or indeed insecurity. In the TRNC case, the distinct perceptions that exist regarding the dominant security actor bear important implications for the security order and management of the conflict. As such, and in addition to offering a rich empirical account of security governance in an unrecognised state, the chapter contributes to wider discussions on governance under conditions of limited statehood in non-recognized states and in conflict settings.

Keywords: security governance; limited statehood; unrecognized states; TRNC; Cyprus

1. Introduction

With the end of the Cold War, the essentially contested nature of statehood was brought to the fore, leading to complex typologies which included the notions of 'failing', 'fragile' and weak states. More recently the idea of governance without a state or areas of limited statehood (ALS) was developed as a departure point from earlier conceptions based on what has been described as a superfluous notion of consolidated statehood to better capture the situation that exists within the majority of the world's polities.[1] To date, much of the writing on areas of limited statehood has focused on formally established states that enjoy international recognition, suggesting that what is lacking is full domestic sovereignty where governments are not able to exercise effective control over certain policy areas within their own borders due to lack of material or institutional administrative capacity.[2] Yet empirical evidence suggests that non-recognised states, i.e. those that are self-proclaimed and lack international recognition internationally, also display a number of important features that overlap with those that are typically attributed to limited statehood. Such features include autonomously determined domestic authority structures yet limited statehood in certain domains which are shaped and controlled by a variety of both internal and external actors. Indeed, recent literature on non-recognised states show that while they lack external recognition there is nonetheless evidence

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of a strong statehood except in certain dimensions that are determined to a large extent by power dynamics that exist between the particular non-recognised entity and the dominant external actor.

In this regard, the chapter complements the existing literature on areas of limited statehood literature by offering an analysis of security governance in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in order to answer the following two-fold central research question: In ALS, how do power dynamics change among actors? And what are the dynamics which affect local responses to competing claims of legitimacy? The chapter begins by providing a brief overview of key concepts such as sovereignty, limited statehood, non-recognised statehood and governance. We then discuss some conceptual issues that arise when the notion of limited statehood is applied to non-recognised states. Drawing on these debates, the next section traces the development of governance in northern Cyprus in its historical context before highlighting the nature of security actors and the provisions of security governance in the TRNC. The chapter concludes by pointing to the distinct perceptions that exist regarding the dominant security actor with implications for the security order and the management of the conflict

2. Conceptual framework

The notion of sovereignty occupies a central place in discussions on statehood.[3] A common reference point in defining statehood is Westphalian sovereignty i.e. an actor's right to exclude other actors from intervening in its authority structures. Max Weber's classic definition also remains highly influential. Weber has claimed that a state is a human community which "(successfully) claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory".[4] The Montevideo Convention, as Crawford highlighted in his seminal work on statehood, is another source that is often cited as a guide in determining statehood.[5] According to the Convention, a state should be able to pinpoint a defined territory, a permanent population, and a government (with the capacity to enter into relations with other states). As Crawford summarised, under these definitions, a non-sine qua for statehood appears to be effective domestic sovereignty, claim of a monopoly over the legitimate use of force and the ability to successfully make, implement, and enforce rules and regulations across all policy arenas within a given territory.[6]

This multifaceted nature of statehood is complicated further by the "historically-specific pathways of state development" and the former's relationship with recognition.[7] While it is not possible to offer a survey of the great variety of arrangements to ascertain the manifold corollaries of state-making that have since filled volumes, a brief look at the notion of recognition nonetheless allows for the problematisation of a tendency to assume *a priori* that recognition is a precondition for statehood and thus governance. While Hillgruber notes that "It is only by recognition that the new state acquires the status of a sovereign state under international law in its relations with the third states recognizing it as such", the declaratory approach on "how a state becomes a state" argues that a state exists prior to recognition; the state's *de facto* existence is separate from its *de jure* status.[8] As Crawford has more recently summarised moreover, recognition of new states is a political act, though one which is in principle independent of the existence of the new state as a full subject of international law.[9] Bearing in mind the theoretical difficulties in reaching any wide agreement on how to define statehood, acknowledging that the act of recognition is political and the state's de facto existence is separate from its de jure status allows us to think of recognised and non-recognised states on the same continuum of statehood. It is with this that we are concerned here. While we do not wish to engage with the discussion on the legal status of non-recognised states including that of the TRNC and its governing institutions, we believe it to be a novel attempt to bring them into the limited statehood literature that may bear fruit in provoking additional discussion on the concept of sovereignty and statehood.

Indeed, in their critique of the notion of sovereignty, Krasner and Risse point out that the typical conception of a state pegged to its Westphalian ideal is "misleading rather than illuminating".[10] As the authors have argued, a more useful notion is that of a "consolidated state" – one that enjoys the privileges of international legal sovereignty, including recognition, the right to enter into treaties, and to join international organizations. Domestically, a consolidated state possesses autonomously determined domestic authority structures and a 'monopoly over legitimate means of violence' together with unhindered authority over all policy domains within its territory.[11] For Krasner and Risse however, the notion of consolidated state does not reflect the reality on the ground since most states are neither consolidated nor failed but can best be described with reference to areas of limited statehood.[12] As Thomas Risse has described, limited statehood "concerns those areas of a country in which governments lack the ability to implement and enforce rules and decisions and/or in which the legitimate monopoly over the means of violence is lacking".[13] Moreover, the circumscribed ability of the

state to enforce rules or to control the means of violence can occur (among others) along two dimensions: (1) territorial, that is, parts of a country's territorial space, and (2) sectoral, that is, with regard to specific policy domains.[14] In other words, what is lacking in all countries except those with consolidated statehood is full domestic sovereignty. As a consequence, most states find their statehood limited in one way or another in either particular policy domains or in certain territories which they do not exercise effective control. In this vein, much of the existing literature describe areas of limited statehood as those in which the state's domestic sovereignty is limited while its external sovereignty or international legitimacy remains intact. This orientation toward recognition notwithstanding, we have chosen an unrecognised state that displays characteristics of sovereignty in its domestic, Westphalian, and interdependence senses, but not in its international legal meaning.

Indeed, non-recognised states literature too has often approached these entities as "strategic objects" i.e. in terms of their relationships with the central state from which they seceded; their patron-state, or the international community in relation to the question of their external legitimacy.[15] In large part, non-recognised states thus continue to remain on the margins of mainstream political science with regards to their inner dynamics and internal legitimacy.[16] As Broers has aptly put it, "they have rarely been the subject of comprehensive enquiry across the same spectrum of hypotheses on key political science questions that researchers have applied to de jure states".[17] This "anomaly in the literature" as Ó Beacháin describes it is largely due to the fact that non-recognised states present a range of conceptual challenges but are also deeply embedded in highly political conflict contexts.[18] It is also for the latter reason that even scholarly enquiry into the dynamics and mechanisms of their internal governance is easily misconstrued as recognition or legitimacy.

As Broers has further pointed out however, the past decade has witnessed the renewal of scholarly interest in non-recognised states in parallel to the renewal of central state authority in these regions.[19] While acknowledging the external factors sustaining non-recognised states, recent scholarship has increasingly asserted the relevance of their internal politics. Indeed, recent works have shown that non-recognised states possess a number of important qualities which help them project the normal appearance of a state.[20] Caspersen has in particular shed much light on the internal sources of state-building, suggesting that "unrecognized states cannot be reduced to their external dimension [...]".[21] One of Caspersen's key assertions is that internal sovereignty can exist without external sovereignty, albeit with a caveat that non-recognition

imposes certain constraints on the forms that internal sovereignty can take. Others have also argued for a more nuanced view of governance with respect to "insurgent governance".[22] The departing point for this analysis too is that the unique nature of governance in non-recognised states curtail the domestic state authority in certain policy domains, deeming them specific forms of areas of limited statehood.[23]

Of particular relevance here to the discussion of governance in non-recognised states with reference to limited statehood is security.[24] The notion of security, especially with the critical turn it took in the 1990s relating to the "broadening of the security agenda" in view of the changing nature of threat and the security referent, lends itself well to the post-Westphalian notion of governance assuming a certain degree of multilateral coordination at more levels and among different actors to face ongoing risks.[25] For Kirchner and Sperling, security governance is "a heuristic device for recasting the problem of security management in order to accommodate the different patterns of interstate interaction, the rising number of non-state security actors, the expansion of the security agenda and conflict regulation or resolution".[26] A 'governance approach' for Schroeder too, helps us understand vertical and horizontal interactions among different actors, serving as an organisational framework.[27]

For Christou et al. however, the literature on security governance is problematic in that it focuses predominantly on the dynamics of 'governance', on the multiplicity of actors, tools and instruments rather than the complexity of security and the implications varied meanings of security have, "lacking nuance in terms of how security is constructed".[28] In response, it is suggested that security governance would benefit from incorporating a *constructivist* approach to security, that would provide "a more complex understanding of the way in which security comes to be understood and intersubjectively defined, which in turn has implications for the relevant actors involved, governance/governmentality strategies and policy practice".[29] In this context, the chapter follows the conceptual lead of Christou and others in uncovering how security issues are 'managed' in non-recognised states, by whom and through what sort of governance practices. In other words, our aim is to trace what sort of practices have been constituted from the constructed security logic and how has this played out in terms of governance. Here, the effectiveness of security governance will be pegged to how the security referent — in this case, the mainstream Turkish Cypriot political parties in particular — receive the security narrative and how they respond to it. In this way we also aim to shed light onto instances where security practice emanating from the security logic "sits uneasily between

exceptional means and normal politics".[30] As such, the analysis will also discuss the question of what this means for the conflict setting.

What is more, the choice of the Turkish Cypriot case is also important for illustrating two more, related points often found in the literature: first, that sovereignty and statehood can have different degrees and should not be seen as absolute; second, that the objectives and ideas driving security governance will often be contested reflecting the contentious politics in which they are (re)produced.[31] With respect to the latter, Brubaker's work on nationalism and nationhood is particularly illuminating.[32] By following Brubaker's lead, the Turkish Cypriot relations with Turkey — as the dominant external security actor — are treated here in a relational manner; as continuously contested fields. As such, it is assumed that there is great variation in the specific perceptions and in the overall stance of domestic actors vis-à-vis the "motherland". A central aspect of this relational nexus is that such domestic struggles over the representation of an external field may be closely linked to struggles among competing stances within the given domestic field. The empirical correlations of these conceptual hunches and their implications are tackled further below.

3. Background

While the infamous Cyprus Problem has attracted increasing international attention over the years, especially on the eve of its accession to the European Union in 2004, what concerns us here by and large is its implications for governance in the territories that invite controversy and contestation in relation to sovereignty. On the one hand, the government of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) claims jurisdiction over the whole of the island and its claims have been supported consistently by the international community - most notably in a series of United Nations (UN) declarations. On the other hand, the government of the TRNC claims jurisdiction over the northern part of the island, a claim that is recognised only by Turkey. The physical division between the two parts of the island is marked by what is known as the Green Line, either side of which is a de-militarised zone that is patrolled by the UN.

Despite international ostracisation, Turkish Cypriots have been governed by a de facto state since 1974. The gradual process of political and administrative evolution that begun with inter-communal strife that saw Turkish Cypriots leaving their government posts and retreating into ethnic enclaves, continued from the General Committee stage (1963-7) through the

Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration (1967-74). In 1974 the situation changed dramatically when the 'Colonel's Junta' in power in Greece sought to incorporate Cyprus into Greece, and attempted to overthrow the democratically elected president of the Republic, Archbishop Makarios. Acting on the legal basis of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, under which Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK) were guarantors of the constitutional settlement on Cyprus (see below), Turkey responded to the coup by intervening so as 'to restore the constitutional order'. However, despite the leaders of the coup being quickly arrested and Makarios being returned to power, Turkish troops remain on the island as part of the ceasefire that came into effect on 16 August 1974. In 1975, a 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' was declared in the territories controlled by the Turkish Cypriot leadership, which embodied the popular idea amongst Turkish and Turkish Cypriot elites of a federation of two semi-autonomous zones, thus replacing the 'Autonomous Cyprus Turkish Administration' (1974-5) and since 1983, the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Today, the regime which remains unrecognised by other states bar Turkey, is a parliamentary system equipped with a government, a central bank, a judiciary and an administration. It is secured by a large mainly Turkish military force and exercises control over the 37% of the island's territory.[33] Yet, being an unrecognised state, the TRNC does not have a postal country code and telecommunications can only reach through Turkey. In order to travel outside Turkey, Turkish Cypriots also require a Turkish or a RoC passport. Another important aspect of the international ostracisation over the unrecognised state is the contentious relationship it has with Turkey.

As Bahcheli and Noel has noted, the de facto partitioning of Cyprus did not only bolster Turkish Cypriots distinctiveness vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots; it also ushered in a more nuanced and subtly altered relationship between Turkish Cypriots and Turkey that had previously been defined, above all, by existential kinship ties.[34] The physical concentration of the Turkish Cypriot community in terms of governance (as opposed to scattered enclaves before 1974), together with a flourishing of governmental institutions boosted their confidence and their sense of distinctiveness vis-à-vis the motherland. An important indicator of change that was taking place in the political culture of the community was a proliferation of political parties. Prior to 1974, party activity and dissent had been actively discouraged by the leadership on grounds of 'national unity against the Greek Cypriot threat'. But with 'mortal threat' (from the Greek Cypriots) gradually replaced with other concerns, political activity flourished, with parties of

the left challenging the nationalist parties of the right, and Turkey's role in Turkish Cypriot affairs being debated openly, as never before.[35]

While this occurs at different levels and in different ways depending on one's interpretation, economic ties are often cited as an indicator of dependency as well as a matter of contention. As a small economy reliant on trade, international ostracisation has led to the growing economic affiliation of the TRNC to Turkey. On the one hand, the relationship can be seen as a source of economic security for the TRNC since the latter as an unrecognised state lacks access to international markets and can only trade through Turkey, with which it shares the same currency. The absence of a large capital market and a lack of control over monetary policy have also meant that the TRNC depends on transfers from the Turkish Republic to sustain its public deficit. Other aspects of the economic relationship include Turkish credit facilities and numerous joint transport networks and development projects.

On the other hand, however, much-needed funds from Turkey are tied to bilateral economic protocols that have included self-regulatory fiscal measures, tasks and responsibilities in the shaping of Turkish Cypriot macroeconomic policy that are often contested. In December 2012, a protocol was signed between the TRNC and Turkey which envisaged a drastic reduction in the size of the public sector but also the privatisation of key Turkish Cypriot assets including electricity, telecommunications and harbours. The opposition parties took on the protocol from the outset with some claiming that it was a mere pretext to facilitate the transfer of strategic state-owned assets to those business circles in Turkey that have aligned themselves with the ruling AKP.[36] Perhaps more remarkably, the proposed measures were also articulated together with prevalent fears related to loss of Turkish Cypriot identity. In this sense, privatisation of public assets has been seen as threatening Turkish Cypriot autonomy by further consolidating Ankara's control in its domestic affairs. To this end, a series of so-called 'Communal Survival' rallies were held in 2011 and 2012 to protest against the measures and tell Ankara to keep its 'hands-off the Turkish Cypriot community'.[37] It is important to note, however, that the most recent protocol signed in May 2016 whereby Turkey has pledged to provide $1.2 billion in aid over three years received a rather dimmed response from critics, particularly with regard to fiscal measures.[38]

The settlement of large numbers of Turkish settlers/immigrants is yet another bitterly disputed issue in the context of Turkish Cypriot relations with Turkey.[39] Right-wing nationalist

parties tend to take a positive view on Turkish immigration which they claim is necessary to maintain a precarious demographic balance against the numerically superior Greek Cypriot community. Centre-left parties and numerous civil society groups, however, tend to oppose uncontrolled Turkish immigration on the grounds that it weakens the Turkish Cypriot identity and have called for restricting future arrivals. As often noted, prior to 2002, there was a clear preference on the part of Turkey for pro-settler, right wing nationalist parties that stressed ever closer ties with Turkey, championed in particular by the late Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash. Yet, the Turkish Cypriot sense of distinctiveness and confidence alluded to above was further boosted by a democratic change of government in parallel to the so-called 'Annan Peace Process', strong determination for a deal and subsequent EU membership in the 2004 referendum vote. The transfer of power in the TRNC that took place during this period also opened up the space for the articulation of other, alternative discourses removing kinship from pride of place with a new generation of political leaders less inclined to regard the Turkish military presence as a factor that trumps all other considerations. Instead, political priorities became more geared toward integration with the wider world and particularly with Europe.

4. The Politics of domestic security governance in the TRNC

Much of the TRNC's existing security architecture originates from the current constitutional structure of the Republic of Cyprus which gives Greece, Turkey and the UK a direct say in the security affairs of the island. More specifically, the three documents that formed the basis of the independent republic in 1960 — the Treaty of Alliance, the Treaty of Establishment and the Treaty of Guarantee — allow Greece and Turkey to station military forces on the island and a right of intervention while the UK is allowed to enjoy two sovereign bases.[40] It was in fact the Treaty of Guarantee which gives the three countries a legal right of intervention, either jointly or on their own, to counter any threat and restore the constitutional integrity of the Republic, which Turkey used in July 1974 to intervene, following a Greek military coup which aimed to overthrow President Makarios and unify the island with Greece.

In this context, Turkey today commands three of its own military units on the island under the Cyprus Turkish Peace Force Command (*Kıbrıs Türk Barış Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı*, KTBK) and is in *de facto* command of the Turkish Cypriot military unit (*Güvenlik Kuvvetleri Komutanlığı*, or the GKK), the TRNC police force, and the fire service. Established in 1976 to replace the now defunct paramilitary group Turkish Defence Force (*Türk Mukavemet Teşkilatı*),

the Command is currently comprised of an estimated 30,000 troops in addition to another 9,000 troops controlled by the GKK.[41] Although distinct military entities, both the KTBK and the GKK are controlled by the Turkish General Staff (TGS) located in Ankara, Turkey. The TGS oversees the Turkish armed forces and is responsible for the security policies of both Turkey and the TRNC. The KTBK, as part of the Turkish Aegean Army based in İzmir, reports directly to the TGS. The GKK, although comprised of Turkish Cypriot soldiers, is commanded by a Turkish one-star General (Brigadier General or *tuğgeneral*) under the control of the TGS who also reports directly to the President of the TRNC, thus providing direct communication between the Turkish military and the TRNC President.[42] Additionally, the Turkish Cypriot police force is part of the GKK and subordinate to the TGS. This is particularly noteworthy since in Turkey the police force together with the Turkish Gendarmerie is part of the Interior Ministry. As it will be discussed further below, this control of all military and police personnel on the island was originally seen by Turkish Cypriots as necessary for security but has been increasingly questioned over the past two decades.

In line with the official discourse of the RoC on the Cyprus Problem, many Greek Cypriots consider the Turkish forces on the island as an "occupation force" and strongly support the idea that any settlement must see the full withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island as well as the end to the right of intervention enshrined in the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.[43] Many also believe that such outdated ideas have no place in a country especially one that is a member of the European Union.[44] Turkish Cypriot opinions on the other hand, are less clear.

Though initially welcomed by the Turkish Cypriot community in the aftermath of the inter-communal strife, the continued presence of the Turkish military on the island has generated some diverging views over the years. As Boone has noted, some Turkish Cypriots support Turkey's military presence, while others privately and publicly call for Turkey to leave the island.[45] A UN blueprint (which came to be remembered with the then Secretary General Kofi Annan) envisaged a federal government and a drastic reduction in the number of Turkish troops and was approved by 76 percent of the Turkish Cypriot community. The majority, it would seem, fall somewhere in the middle, understanding why Turkey is on the island but wishing that such conditions could be removed with the resolution of the conflict.[46]

Divergent perceptions over the role and the status of the Turkish military forces on the island notwithstanding, the status of the police force has attracted controversy among Turkish

Cypriot political parties during several high-profile disputes at governmental level and more recently during a constitutional referendum which included removal of the contested 'Article 10' which ties the police to the Turkish military on the island.[47] According to the Transitional Article 10 of the TRNC constitution:

> The provisions of Article 117 of this Constitution [giving the control of the GKK to the Council of Ministers] shall not enter into force as long as they are needed for the defense and internal security of the Turkish Cypriot people in line with the international situation. The implementation of the principles and procedures applicable to the external and internal security, the provisions applicable to them and the principles of cooperation to be adopted in these matters shall continue to be applied at the date of the entry into force of the Constitution.

In practice, the Article envisages an integrated approach to security whereby vertical and horizontal interactions among different foreign and domestic security actors are centralised yet in a rather blurred fashion that makes it difficult to pinpoint the central decision-making authority. The transitional Article also makes it clear that such an institutional arrangement is necessitated by the security climate in the context of a lingering conflict. However, such an integrated approach in the field of security has not been welcomed by all political parties in the TRNC. In this regard, while some political parties on the right of the political spectrum have not taken issue with the integrated structuring security framework and institutions, parties of the left have tended to promote a clear-cut separation of external and domestic security governance. More specifically, the latter have been vocal in their demands that internal security should be governed by local and civil authorities (i.e. Ministry of Interior) through the separation of administrative structures of security governance and a restructuring of their hierarchies.

In this context, the sharp contrast in competing claims over the nature of the relationship between external and domestic security governance have, over the years, led to heated confrontations between certain political parties with some involving the security institutions themselves. A particularly important instance of such confrontation over Article 10 took place in 2000 following a call by the coalition partner Communal Liberation Party (*Toplumcu Kurtuluş Partisi*, or the TKP) and it's the then leader Mustafa Akıncı to move the police from under supervision of the GKK to the TRNC Interior Ministry, which is the same as it is in Turkey. Akıncı's call was received angrily by the Turkish General Özeyranlı who at a conscript oath taking ceremony accused Akıncı and others who demanded a change in the law with 'treason'. More specifically, the General claimed that: "*If dynamites are placed under the state's*

foundations before the people's eyes and the [political] authorities fail to protect their state, the GKK […] will. The Armed Forces are tight-lipped but when needed, they will not shy away from evaluating the situation."[48] The speech resulted in the Deputy Prime Minister Akıncı walking out of the ceremony in protest.[49] Akıncı later criticized the General's comments as "absurd". As Akıncı continued:

> For the General, the ongoing ceasefire and the special circumstances [linked to the Cyprus Problem] are the reason why [the police remain under the control of the GKK]. Yet in the South [RoC] the police are part of the civilian authority. [Even] in Turkey, going through a difficult time in combatting terrorism, the police are under the Ministry of Interior. We [Turkish Cypriots] want to manage our own affairs.[50]

The proposed amendment which was supported by left-wing parties was ultimately dropped and remained on the margins of the political agenda (occasionally referred to in the party manifestos and government programmes though in a rather muted fashion) until 2013 when it was brought into the limelight once more in the context of constitutional reform.

In 2014, a constitutional reform package was proposed by the Republican Turkish Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi*, CTP) and though an amendment revoking Article 10 failed to win parliamentary support to be put to a referendum in 2014, it nonetheless exposed once again the line of demarcation with regard to the military's control of the police force. For their part, the right-wing Nationalist Unity Party (*Ulusal Birlik Partisi*, or the UBP) and the Democratic Party (*Demokrat Parti*, or the DP) blocked efforts to include the amendment in the referendum (as part of the proposed package), reflecting their consistent opposition to all efforts to remove Article 10 from the constitution.[51] According to Hüseyin Özgürgün, the chairman of the UBP, the Transitional Article 10 had "nothing to do with putting the police under civilian control but [it's] rather about the status of Turkish military presence".[52] Other arguments levied against calls to abandon Article 10 from the UBP have also included the assertion that the latter would only serve to politicise the police force. This argument was famously put forward by the late Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash in the context of the spat between the Prime Minister Akıncı and General Ozeyranlı discussed above. As Denktash argued back then, giving the control of the police force to the Ministry of Interior would allow political elites to "corrupt the police force", and that it was "not the right time" to take such a risk.[53] On the other hand, Kudret Özersay, who served in the negotiating team of Rauf Denktash and as the leader of the now-defunct leader of the "Pulling Together" (*Toparlanıyoruz)* movement which later transformed itself into the centre-right People's Party (*Halkın Partisi*, or HP) previously stated that the

powers exercised by the president are influenced by the military authorities, and that "Article 10" of the constitution makes the political state an extraordinary one as the police are bound to the army.[54] More recently, Özersay has suggested that a new security agreement with Turkey could provide the necessary ground to annul Article 10 without jeopardising the integrity of the Treaty of Guarantee.[55]

It is interesting to note however that the CTP, following its failure to secure enough parliamentary support for the amendment, has changed its rhetoric on Article 10 claiming that revoking it would not necessitate an amendment to the constitution. Tufan Erhürman, the incumbent leader of the Party (and the Prime Minister since January 2017) has claimed that another legal route to tackle this "*serious democratic deficit which hinders the ability of the state to claim authority and responsibility in relation to one of its fundamental functions that is internal security*" is to propose a new bill that would declare the article null and void. For Erhürman, Article 10 already contains an expiry clause tying it to the security of the Turkish Cypriot people and the international context that could be revoked by the Parliament should it wish to do so. Turkish Cypriot MPs could simply declare in Parliament that the internal security context as well as the international juncture no longer necessitates control of the Police by the Armed Forces.

Since 2013, this controversy continues to remain on the agenda although in a rather muted and perhaps contradictory fashion. This is perhaps most visible in recent statements from the CTP, largest of the 4-party (DP-CTP-TDP-HP) coalition. For the CTP leader Erhürman, since the GKK is controlled by the Prime Minister's Office, the police that is tied to the GKK is also under the effective control of the latter:

> It is not true, therefore, to claim that the political authorities are not responsible or have control over the police force. As the serving Prime Minister, I can take certain initiatives within my authority and I continue to do so. While I continue to believe that [the Article 10] should be revoked, the fact that it is there does not and should not mean that political authority has no say or responsibility over police matters. In public law, authority and responsibility are analogous.[56]

Erhürman's view is also echoed in the 4-party coalition programme.[57] The programme does not address the separation of external and internal security governance explicitly and makes no specific reference to Article 10. However, it asserts that both the police force and the GKK it is accountable to are, by law, under the direct authority of the Prime Minister. The

Programme ultimately asserts the institutional authority of the Prime Minister's Office over both the police force and the GKK with reference to maintaining public order (read internal security governance). The Programme also mentions the intention of the government to sign an agreement with Turkey to formulate the TRNC's external, military security relations.

5. Security and contentious politics in non-recognised states

Different parameters of the ongoing conflict, together with contested perceptions regarding the dominant security actor — in this case, Turkey — have shaped the formation and transformation of security governance in the TRNC. The over-imposing security logic that attaches the physical security of the Turkish Cypriot community to the Cyprus Problem through the "Turkish Guarantees" has meant that the TRNC has neither control over its external defense nor its domestic security governance mechanisms. This is not uncommon for non-recognised states. Indeed, as Pegg has noted, a distinct feature of state-building efforts in non-recognised states is the emphasis on security and fear.[58] The typical result is a state that is top heavy on military and security expenditure and/or has largely outsourced its security needs to an external state like Turkey.

It is important to note too that the line of demarcation among domestic actors over the status of the police force in the TRNC also resembles discussions that often take place around security sector reform in other contexts. More specifically, it is possible to see contention over security governance in the TRNC to be one between an integrated model of government versus a fragmented model of governance.[59] The former encompasses the traditional view of security as centralisation, characterised by a hierarchical, democratic and consensual nature.[60] In this model, the highest decision-making authority rests with national governments. Subnational or international/external actors and or bodies are subordinate to them. The latter is characterised by fragmentation and differentiation, by the horizontal dispersion of authority among public and private actors at different levels.[61] However, the TRNC case has a number of features that make it sit uneasily within this account. Instead there appears to be a hybrid sovereign relation between the external security actor (Turkey) that exerts functions typically pertaining to the sovereign (TRNC) in a centralised manner while the critics promote somewhat of a differentiated governance system — yet centralised in character — in their attempt to exercise or reassert their 'fragile' sovereignty.

Contestation over the current status of the police force points to a security logic that is centred on the ongoing conflict, not only placing Turkey as the fundamental cornerstone of Turkish Cypriots' physical security vis-à-vis Greek Cypriots, but also introducing a sense of exceptionality that frames and, in some cases, limits statehood. It is in this context i.e. the ongoing Cyprus problem that TRNC "temporarily" cedes responsibility for public security and defense to Turkey. Consequently, it poses the paradox in which the Turkish army through its guardianship of the Turkish Cypriot community is seen to be limiting the former's statehood in terms of domestic security governance. From a conflict perspective moreover, this paradox has important implications in that the security actor (Turkey) may have no choice but to "securitize" certain issues — in order to sustain the legitimacy and the integrity of its security governance enshrined in the founding treaties — which indirectly contributes to a perpetuation of the conflict.

These outcomes further point to two related points often found in the literature: first, that sovereignty and statehood can have different degrees and should not be seen as absolute; second, that the objectives and ideas driving security governance will often be contested reflecting the contentious politics in which they are (re)produced.[62] In this regard, the TRNC too, though often considered to enjoy high internal sovereignty, finds itself limited in relation to the control of its domestic security affairs.[63] Regarding external governance of internal security, the contested nature of the security architecture, the de facto hierarchy, and the conflict in supposedly consensual mechanisms was highlighted throughout the analysis. The latter also confirms Brubaker's lead, that there is great variation in the specific perceptions and in the overall stance of domestic actors vis-à-vis the "motherland".[64] A central aspect of this relational nexus is that such domestic struggles over the representation of an external field may be closely linked to struggles among competing stances within the given domestic field.

On the whole, the argument that the lingering conflict and the security logic it imposes often leads to different interpretations of sovereignty and competitive claims to statehood, all with their own perceptions of external security actors, are demonstrated in the views of the parties, in one way or another, that the status-quo stems from the unresolved Cyprus Problem. As suggested by others, if channelled into productive and open debate, contestation as such does not have to be a bad thing and might indeed help to facilitate learning and generate legitimacy. Since legitimacy is essential for governance as it "confers authority over governing structures", and it in turn implies an attempt to provide security "for as many as possible" the

contested nature of security outlined in the TRNC case also holds important comparative value for other conflict settings.[65]

6. Conclusion

To date, much of the writing on areas of limited statehood has focused on formally established states that enjoy international recognition, suggesting that what is lacking is full domestic sovereignty thus neglecting non-recognised states. Non-recognized states literature too has often approached these entities as "strategic objects" with regard to their inner dynamics and internal legitimacy. This chapter has aimed to bridge this gap, in the hope of provoking further discussion through a discussion of security governance in an unrecognised state that analysed contestation among actors and the dynamics which affect local responses to competing claims of legitimacy. The findings here make clear that parameters of conflict hinder the introduction of a multi-level governance model implied in the literature because of the barriers it sets for the contested state authorities. At the same time, however, there exists instances and conditions which can facilitate efforts towards a governance model through wider public debate that seems to be taking place in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. These findings and the conceptual framework they draw from are important for understanding mechanisms of governance in areas of limited statehood beyond traditional national contexts. Yet, with conflict being the over-imposing dynamic in most such settings, this study aspires to encourage more research on the links between limited statehood and the promotion of security and reconciliation.

Notes

1. Risse, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood"; Krasner and Risse, "External Actors, State-building and Service Provisions".
2. Krasner and Risse, "External Actors, State-building and Service Provisions".
3. Kyris and Bouris, "Europeanisation, Sovereignty and Contested States".
4. Weber, 1916, cited in Lottholz and Lemay-Hebért, "Re-reading Weber, reconceptualizing state-building".
5. Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law".
6. See also Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*; Risse, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood".
7. Dryzek and Dunleavy, *Theories of the Democratic State*; Crawford, "The Criteria for Statehood in International Law".
8. Hillgruber, "The Admission of New States to the International Community", 494.
9. Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law*, 22.
10. Krasner and Risse, "External Actors, State-building and Service Provisions", 545.
11. Krasner, *Sovereignty: Organised Hypocrisy*; Risse, "Governance in Areas of Limited Statehood".
12. Krasner and Risse, "External Actors, State-building and Service Provisions".
13. Risse, *Domestic Politics and Norm Diffusion in International Relations*, 200.
14. Polese and Santini, "Limited Statehood and Its Security Implications".
15. O'Loughlin, et al., "Inside the post-Soviet de facto States"; Gerrits and Bader, "Russia patronage over Abkhazia and South Ossetia"; Markedonov, "The Unrecognized States of Eurasia".
16. Ó Beacháin, "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics in Abkhazia".
17. Broers, "Recognising Politics in Unrecognised States", 59.
18. Ó Beacháin, "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics in Abkhazia",166.
19. Broers, "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics in Abkhazia".
20. Blakkisrud and Pål Kolstø, "Dynamics of De Facto Statehood"; Caspersen, *Unrecognized states: The Struggle for Sovereignty*; Voller, "Contested Sovereignty as an Opportunity".
21. 2013:76.
22. Metelits, *Inside Insurgency*; Kevlihan, *Aid, insurgencies and Conflict Transformation*.
23. Though also important, we nonetheless look at the impact of the security governance on the conflict through the parameters of limited statehood rather than changes induced by non-recognition more generally.
24. This is particularly more so since the former is often a product of conflict (and specifically ethno-national conflict), and not least because in such conflict or post-conflict settings, security takes a different meaning that revolves around competing identities which links security governance to the 'enemy other'.
25. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*; Krause and Williams, "Broadening the Agenda of Security Studies", Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*; on 'governance' see, Kirchner and Sperling, *EU Security Governance*.
26. Kirchner and Sperling, *Global Security Governance*, 18.
27. Schroeder, "Coping with Complexity", 5.
28. 2010:345.
29. Christou and Croft, "European Union Security Governance", 9.
30. Christou et al., "European Union Security Governance", 350.
31. See also Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories*, 12; Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl, "Towards security governance as a critical tool", 152.

32. Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed*.
33. Solsten, *Cyprus: A Country Study*.
34. Bahcheli and Noel, "Ties That No Longer Bind".
35. İbid.
36. HaberKıbrıs.com, "Yangın Helikopterine Yok, TOMA'ya Var".
37. HaberKıbrıs.com, "Toplumsal Varoluş Mitingi Yapıldı".
38. Yenidüzen. "Protokol İmzalandı".
39. Cirakli, "Identity, immigration and citizenship in northern Cyprus".
40. Full text of the treaties are available online on the Turkish Foreign Ministry website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/sub.en.mfa?f3fbd176-6aac-4870-a3bc-4df746d999e0 [accessed online 20 September 2018].
41. It is important to note however that these figures are only estimates since the actual numbers cannot be confirmed.
42. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 80.
43. Georgiades, "Public Attitudes toward Peace"; Kathimerini, "Anastasiades says guarantees cannot be part of a solution".
44. Ker-Lindsay, "The Security Dimension of a Cyprus Solution", 4.
45. Boone, "Negotiating 'Turkishness' in North Cyprus", 91.
46. See also Bryant and Yakinthou, "Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey".
47. Though the status of the police force is just one part of the security governance in the TRNC, it has nonetheless been chosen here as a policy outcome to illustrate the contestation that takes place at the local level toward the existing security logic.
48. Hürriyet, "Komutan Krizi".
49. Jenkins, *Context and Circumstance*, 80; Kanli and Alkan, "KKTC-Turkey row".
50. Hürriyet, "Komutan Krizi".
51. Havadis, "Referandum seçimin gölgesinde".
52. Ada Haber, "Özgürgün'den çarpıcı açıklamalar".
53. Hürriyet, "Komutan Krizi".
54. LGC News, "Toparlanıyoruz founder speaks out".
55. Detay, "Kudret Özersay vizyonunu açıkladı"; Havadis, "Özersay: Mevcut haliyle KKTC sürdürülebilir değildir".
56. Kıbrıs, "Polis dolaylı olarak Başbakanlık'a bağlıdır".
57. KKTC Başbakanlık, "Hükümet Programı".
58. Pegg, "Twenty Years of de facto State Studies".
59. Krahmann, 2003.
60. Majone, 1997: 162; Jessop, 2000: 13.
61. Krahmann, "Conceptualizing Security Governance".
62. See also Caplan, *International Governance of War-Torn Territories*, 12.
63. See Kyris and Bouris, "Europeanisation, Sovereignty and Contested States".
64. Brubaker, , Nationalism Reframed.
65. Webber, "The governance of European security", 7; Ehrhart, Hegemann and Kahl, "Towards security governance as a critical tool", 153.

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